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Abstract 
We study the consequences of equity mispricing (a bubble) and the correction thereof 
(the bubble bursting) for real activity in a production economy. In our model, producers 
are financed by both bank debt and equity, and face a mix of systemic and idiosyncratic 
uncertainty. Positive/negative bubbles arise when prior public beliefs about the aggregate 
productivity of producers (business sentiment) become biased upwards/downwards. Eco-
nomic activity in equilibrium is influenced by the bubble size in conjunction with agency 
problems caused by delegation of lending to relationship bankers. We explore the ability 
of a macroprudential policy instrument (a convex dependence of bank capital require-
ments on the quantity of uncollateralized credit) to dampen the consequences of a burst 
bubble. We find that macroprudential policies are more successful in suppressing equity 
price swings than moderating output fluctuations. At the same time, economic activity 
recoils substantially with the introduction of a macroprudential instrument, so that its 
presence is likely to entail tangible welfare costs. In this regard, fine-tuning capital 
charges as a function of corporate governance on the borrower side (specifically, by dis-
couraging limited liability of borrowing firm managers) would be less costly than placing 
the full burden of prudential regulation on the lender side. 
1. Introduction 
Asset price bubbles, i.e., asset prices deviating from fundamentals due to 
the prevalence of self-fulfilling incorrect beliefs in the market, are known to have 
long-lasting implications for the  real economy. They cause both misallocation of 
resources while emerging and severe disruptions of economic activity when the even-
tual price correction (bubble bursting) takes place, all the more so in the presence of 
significant amounts of bank credit to the  real sector, i.e., when the  economy is 
leveraged. The latest global financial crisis has provided abundant examples of sud-
den breakdown of credit relationships when poorly informed investors revised their 
previously held views. The aggregate magnitude of the ensuing negative financing 
shock was big enough to make the financial crisis go over into a worldwide reces-
sion. Although initially only a  minority of financial institutions were affected by 
adverse balance sheet developments, businesses seemed to have difficulty finding 
a replacement for their original lender when the latter became either distressed or over-
cautious.  
In the face of a crisis already in full progress, financial sector regulators are 
unable to provide a prompt remedy, whereas the monetary policy potential is often 
quickly exhausted by the zero interest rate boundary and limits to quantitative easing. 
That is why interest in the second pillar of policy response to asset price develop-
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ments, i.e., the group of so-called macroprudential instruments, is on the rise.
1 How-
ever, the impact of macroprudential policies on the supply side of the economy re-
mains to be analyzed in proper depth, given the lack of both generally accepted 
theories and sufficient empirical evidence. 
The present paper seeks to contribute to the objective of understanding the mu-
tual workings of asset price bubbles and macroprudential policies by proposing 
a model of imperfect financial intermediaries in a production economy. To this end, 
we set up an environment in which firms seek both equity and debt financing under 
partial opacity: some uncertainties in producer performance are, in principle, resolv-
able in advance of the financing decision when the appropriate asset management 
regime is chosen, but incentives in financial institutions may work against the resolu-
tion. Other, systemic uncertainties may initially be perceived with a bias by investors, 
leading to mispricing of both equity and debt and, consequently, to distorted capital 
formation and output losses in the affected real sector. 
Specifically, firms have production functions with two risky components in 
their total factor productivity. The first is a systemic risk factor with a distribution func-
tion known to everyone. In addition, there is a  firm-specific component (the  firm’s 
type) which is known to the firm management but cannot be precisely and credibly 
communicated to either equity investors or wholesale banks. The firm manager can 
only send a public signal about the productivity level as a whole, in which systemic 
uncertainty contaminates the  message about the  idiosyncratic productivity compo-
nent value. Only a loan manager with specific expertise (a retail relationship banker) 
has the necessary non-transferrable skills to learn the borrowing firm’s type.
2 Such 
a delegated manager can be hired by the wholesale bank for a fee to set the lending 
rate and collect the proceeds. 
The first distinguishing feature of the model is that return on real investment 
is affected by a specific input required by the corporate governance mechanism in 
place in the  firm. The  input can be thought of as a  separate strain of managerial 
human capital related to production (not to be mixed up with knowledge about 
technology type, as in the previously mentioned relationship banker case). It is firm- 
-specific and, consequently, no individual is able to distribute its provision among all 
firms. This circumstance works as an obstacle to full-fledged diversification of equity 
holdings by retail investors.
3 For simplicity, we concentrate on the extreme case by 
assuming that each of the retail investors can only observe the human capital level in 
a single firm. Then, by selecting the right parameters one can generate an economy in 
which holding shares in other firms is strictly dominated by only holding shares of 
1 What is usually meant are regulatory guidelines regarding, inter alia, counter-cyclical capital buffers, 
loan-to-value ratios, leverage limits, variable risk weights, and collateral requirements. 
2 For simplicity, we only consider the case in which the loan manager finds out the type precisely, i.e., knows
the same thing as the firm manager. Generalizations allowing the relationship banker to learn the type with 
a noise, although with a higher precision than the public, are possible but do not add much to the quali-
tative insights of the model. 
3 One can imagine that every retail investor is somehow specialized in a particular economic sector re-
presented by a set of identical firms. This is the sector to which the investor supplies his own human 
capital (this time in a managerial capacity, so that specialization generates a learning-by-doing effect) and, 
as a result, has sufficient expertise to make a qualified choice of stock to own within the sector, but not 
outside it. Alternatively, one could imagine a household of two, with one member supplying equity financ-
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the firm whose human capital level one knows. Thus, equity financing is possible but 
share demand only comes from a subset of knowledgeable investors. 
Another key element of the model is a specific rationale for the existence of 
banks. Since, as agreed, the circle of possible equity holders of each firm is limited, 
firms also seek debt financing, whereas retail investors look for opportunities to sub-
stitute for missing equity portfolio diversification by holding deposits. As opposed to 
retail investors, the bank (we use the term wholesale bank) can lend to any firm. That 
is why it can present itself as a diversifying intermediary but, at the same time, ex-
tract rents as an exclusive operator of the necessary financial technology. 
Due to the mentioned technological exclusivity, the bank, or better said, the fi-
nancial services sector as a whole, has considerable market power. This is why 
the well-known agency problem of fund diversion becomes important. According to 
our view, a financial institution sells claims to the public (here, collects deposits from 
retail investors) by declaring one investment pattern for the proceeds, whereas the ac-
tual management of borrowed funds follows a different pattern as far as it cannot be 
fully contracted and verified. The bank accepts deposits with the declared objective 
to invest them optimally in the whole spectrum of available firms, i.e., to diversify 
retail investors’ funds for them. Naturally, returns on lending to every individual firm 
are higher if its type (the idiosyncratic component of its technology level) is ob-
served, so that the wholesale bank is supposed to delegate to a relationship banker. 
However, the latter, being the exclusive holder of firm-specific knowledge, has con-
siderable bargaining power vis-à-vis the  wholesale bank. Therefore, he can drive 
the required fee up to the level at which the wholesale bank becomes indifferent be-
tween employing his services and managing the loan itself based on public informa-
tion alone. Then, it may happen that negotiations with the retail banker break down, 
delegation does not take place, and the loan is managed by the wholesale bank “at 
arm’s length”. In the extreme, these arm’s length loans can be packaged, tranched, 
and sold to other banks in CDO form. And, at times, this can even be preferable both 
subjectively (the wholesale bank earns more on its loan portfolio) and socially (lower 
interest rates on average, more investment of debt-financed capital, and hence higher 
output). The problem is that the outcome is sensitive, among other things, to the qual-
ity of public information. 
This brings us to the  third key element of the  model: public sentiment  as 
a source of equity price bubbles. Namely, we propose the following mechanism of 
rationalizing the  emergence of bubbles. We take public information about firms’ 
types to be a  Bayesian update of a  prior belief distribution by an unbiased signal 
coming from the  firm. If the  prior distribution is biased, we say that there exists 
(prejudiced) public sentiment. Since each firm’s public signal is noisy, the prior 
belief update, although able to reduce the bias, is unable to completely eliminate it. Ac-
cordingly, prior prejudice impacts on equilibrium equity prices, lending rates, invest-
ment volumes, and output. It is easy to demonstrate that the firm equity price is 
above/below the unbiased prior sentiment benchmark when the bias sign is positive/ 
/negative. In that case, we talk about a positive/negative bubble. Numerical examples 
in sections 3 and 4 will illustrate the extent of this effect relative to the accompanying 
loss of output, the price of credit, and default frequencies. 
In the extreme, our model allows for accommodating the real consequences of 
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that there are just two productivity types, high and low. A priori, both the retail in-
vestors and the wholesale bankers may believe that there are more low productivity 
firms (the mass of the low type is greater than ½ – pessimistic sentiment), whereas in 
truth, the high and low types both have mass ½. (Other possible combinations of 
truth and sentiment are discussed in section 3.) It is possible that, under a particular 
sentiment and other exogenous parameter values, there exists an equilibrium with 
delegated loan management but no equilibrium with arm’s length management. So, 
in that case, if wholesale-retail banker bargaining about the compensation of the lat-
ter is unsuccessful, there is a big group of firms (in the binary example above, all 
low-type ones) that cease to operate because they cannot finance production with 
either equity or debt, and there is a considerable reduction in output.
4 However, more 
common are situations in which both bubble-free and bubbly equilibria exist, but 
the latter are associated with a reduction of economic activity. 
Although the use of macroprudential policy tools is primarily motivated by 
financial stability considerations, public debate often associates with them the power 
to contain the adverse real implications of asset price bubbles as well. We try to give 
a  formal structure to this debate by introducing a  macroprudential instrument in 
the potentially bubbly environment outlined above. Namely, we investigate the im-
pact of additional (and convexly growing) regulatory capital charges on banks that 
lend to firms with a low relative size of own equity. Although the true advantages 
and disadvantages of such policy instruments can only become fully visible in a dy-
namic model (whereas ours is a two-period one), we are nevertheless able to gauge 
the  basic qualitative consequences of the  said policy for economic fundamentals 
within each period. 
Summarizing our main findings, we establish that 
A.  there are real economic costs of both positive and negative bubbles, regardless of 
the prior bias sign; 
B.  macroprudential capital surcharges on banks marginally increase the benign reac-
tion of the economy to the removal of a bubble; however, they also have a strong 
depressing effect on economic activity without any reduction of default rates; 
C.  limited liability of borrowers exacerbates the consequences of bubbles. Introduc-
ing more downside risk at default for managers of borrower firms, by reducing 
sensitivity to exogenous parameters, achieves better bubble containment than 
macroprudential capital surcharges. In addition, equilibria in this “proportional 
liability” regime are associated with reduced default rates for the most risky bor-
rowers, compared to the pure limited liability case. 
In this paper, we discuss a two-period setup, mainly for reasons of economy 
of space, although a  multi-period generalization would constitute no conceptual 
problem. 
1.1 Related Literature 
In an ideal (“Modigliani-Miller”) world of competitive and efficient financial 
intermediation, often used as a convenient shortcut in macro models, there is no place 
4 This effect generated by the model, as we believe, offers a plausible imitation of at least some instances 
of the transition from “purely financial” revision of beliefs and the corresponding turbulence in asset mar-
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for asset price bubbles. Although more recent DSGE-with-financial-frictions models 
assign a place to the financial sector, they usually rely on a properly functioning fi-
nancial intermediary as a propagator of real shocks. But the latest global crisis, and 
particularly the extent of the credit decline at its peak, has uncovered a certain deficit 
of attention to improperly functioning financial intermediaries as a  shock source. 
However, the bulk of the existing macro literature is preoccupied with orderly market 
operation, conceding but modest space to shortcomings both on the capital provider 
and capital consumer sides. Investigations into the interplay of financial and real 
shocks on the macro level have not been too numerous. The concept of costly state 
verification (CSV) in contract theory (Townsend, 1979) has been widely used in real 
business cycle models (first of all by suggesting the appropriate way of modeling de-
fault on debt contracts). Inspired by CSV models, the financial accelerator construc-
tion of Bernanke et al. (1999) has been an influential example of feeding a financial 
sector factor into quantitative macroeconomic theory. However, the (fulfilled) objec-
tive of Bernanke et al. (1999) was to codify, not necessarily explain, the main realities  
of financial sector presence in the economy, as they strived to reflect empirically 
important business cycle phenomena related to financial frictions. In essence, Ber-
nanke et al. (1999) and the succeeding DSGE-with-financial-frictions models (e.g. 
Christiano et al., 2008) accommodate plausible sources of financial shocks through 
an ingenious choice of free parameters in otherwise standard optimization problems 
of agents. As the  very term “financial accelerator” suggests, the  financial sector 
shapes the real shock propagation mechanism in the economy, but does not itself 
originate the events of interest in these models, as capital suppliers do not possess 
sufficient pre-requisites with regard to either standing in the market or informational 
endowments.
5 Therefore, they are unable to “misbehave” in a natural way (e.g. in 
terms of adverse selection, reputation, incomplete contracts, herding behavior, etc.) 
along the lines drawn by the financial intermediation theory. The latter, on the other 
hand, relies on toy models which provide only very indirect, if any, empirical guid-
ance. Another insufficiently developed link in the current state of the financial ac-
celerator literature is that with the  asset pricing theory. Naturally, the  latter, to 
the degree it is trapped in the efficient market paradigm, does not make synergies any 
easier. With the  outbreak of the  global crisis in 2007, a  more in-depth synergetic 
analysis received an unprecedented impulse, but relevant contributions are naturally 
taking time to materialize. Therefore, most literature to the point is quite recent and 
many inspiring studies still exist in a preliminary form only. 
Logically, in the course of the current crisis, interest has turned to the propa-
gation of real effects of financial shocks proper, so that empirical evidence of such 
propagation will no doubt soon abound (see, for example, Campello et al., 2009, for 
an up-to-date contribution). At the same time, the new wave of attention devoted to 
the role of monetary policy in the run-up to financial crises has rekindled interest in 
5 One example is the full competitiveness assumption, which imposes the zero-profit constraint on lenders. 
What may be a gain in analytic convenience (a reduction of the number of free parameters) is also a loss in 
flexibility, since the market power of the lender is a feature one would really want to be able to model. 
Besides, it is often overlooked that zero profit is a two-way “egalitarian” constraint: not just is economic
profit prohibited, but also losses are ruled out. But to model a bank without a downside risk would be near-
ly irrelevant for meaningful applications, for which claim at least the reality of the current crisis, even if 
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formal modeling of macro-prudential policy tools that augment standard Taylor rule- 
-based interest rate policies. Already, quantitative assessments, based on tentative 
synthetic techniques, have been conducted under the  impression of the  financial 
crisis and global recession (see, for example, Chapter III of the IMF October 2009 
World Economic Outlook). The exercise done there uses the approach inspired by, 
inter alia, Aoki et al. (2004), Iacoviello (2005), and Monacelli (2009). Naturally, a prop-
er quantitative analysis of the  workings of those additional instruments requires 
a more explicit role of financial intermediation than was usual in earlier macro mod-
els. Our paper constitutes a step in this direction, as we propose a fairly general way 
of introducing macroprudential instruments in a production economy with a financial 
sector. Unlike some other recent contributions that, although taking both corporate 
and bank default into consideration, leave systemic driving factors of default outside 
the model (de Walque et al., 2009), we preserve the main features of the risky lend-
ing paradigm of the financial intermediation literature (see, for example, Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). 
Our model output testifies to high sensitivity of economic activity in equi-
librium to the incentives within the borrowing firms, delegation within financial inter-
mediaries, and the marginal rate of prudential capital charges. As regards the first two 
factors, our results are akin to the body of knowledge within the strand of literature 
that describes the far-reaching implications of the manager incentive scheme choice 
under separation of ownership and control, in DSGE models (cf. Donaldson et al., 
2009). Awareness of the costs of the third (non-linear capital charge) factor has so far 
been widespread among practitioners. The present model complements this awareness 
with a micro-founded analysis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the construc-
tion of the model. Section 3 introduces a parametric version of the model, which we 
solve numerically. In that section, outcomes of various numeric experiments in 
the presence of equity price bubbles are reproduced. Then, in section 4, we experi-
ment with the interplay between the bubbles and a macro-prudential policy instru-
ment that generates non-linear charges on non-collateralized loans, and confront 
the  outcome with the  effect of modifying borrower liability in default. Section 5 
outlines possibilities of further research and concludes. 
2. Model 
The economy offers a set L of production capacities, or industries, that also 
serve as opportunities to invest. Each production capacity has its own c.r.s. produc-
tion function to be described later, with inputs provided in period one generating 
stochastic revenue in period two. All inputs, investment, and output are expressed in 
terms of a single unit of account. There are two periods and three groups of agents: 
retail investors, firm managers (or simply firms), and banks. The latter group has two 
tiers: wholesale banks and relationship banks. Next, we describe the objectives and 
choices of the named agents one by one. 
2.1 Retail Investors 
Each retail investor has a stock of initial wealth w0 and a stock ml of non- 
-transferable expertise in exactly one industry l∈L. This human capital is sold to some 
firm from l (they are assumed identical) in period 1 at price z
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assume that human capital supply is inelastic, i.e., the whole stock ml is sold re-
gardless of the value of z
l. This same investor, or the second member of the same 
household, can use cash w0 + z
lml available in period 1 to either buy shares in firms  




l is the total factor productivity parameter. Exact expres-
sions will be given in the next subsection. The important point is that since another 
member of the same household supplies firm-specific human capital to l, the retail 
investor household knows the  exact levels of inputs in the  production function. 
Therefore, even though productivity realization in period 2 is uncertain, the degree of 
uncertainty is much lower than it would be if the investor decided to buy shares in 
another industry n∈L. For an outsider, only return y
n without a breakdown into factor 
inputs and productivity would be known, which would combine the uncertainties 
over A
n, physical capital kn (see section 2.2 on firms below), and mn. Without going 
into technical detail, we assume that the resulting uncertainty is so high that it is too 
risky and hence never optimal for any retail investor to reduce share holdings in his 
“own” industry and buy shares in outside ones. 
If the investor buys xl shares in industry l at price p
l (which he takes as exoge-
nous), his wealth in period 2 is equal to 
                                          ( ) 0 (1 )
ll l
ll l wx y iw z m p x =+ + +−  
This final wealth, which is uncertain due to the uncertainty in A
l, enters the in-
vestor’s utility function, whose conditional expectation in period 1 is maximized with 
respect to the admissible choices of xl. The interval of admissible choices is [0,1]. 
This means that the number of shares in each industry is normalized to unity and 
short-selling is not allowed. 
Denote the investor utility by U and his subjective beliefs about the distri-
bution of A
l-values by ϕ. We will only consider continuous non-atomic distributions, 
so that ϕ is a well-defined density. Then the investor solves the problem 
                         ( ) ( ) 0
01





Ux yA i w z m p x A d A φ
≤≤
++ + − ∫          (1) 
The outcome can be either an internal solution characterized by the first-order 
condition 
          ( ) () 0 ()( 1 ) ()( 1 ) () 0
ll l l l
ll l Ux yA iw z m p x yA i p A d A φ ⎡⎤ ′ + ++ − − + = ⎣⎦ ∫          (2) 
or a corner solution in situations where the left-hand side of (2) does not change sign 
for xl∈(0,1). We will exclude from consideration the trivial corner solution xl=0 (which 
corresponds to firms without any outside equity capital) and consider the remaining 
cases. 
The internal solution is the one conventionally exploited by finance theory. In 
conjunction with the standard assumptions of identical investors (applied to our set-
ting, this means a representative retail investor with special expertise in industry l, for 
each l separately) and market clearing (the representative investor holds xl=1) it can 
be restated as 
                  () ( ) 0
1
()( 1 ) ()()
1
ll l l l
l pU y A i w z m p y A A d A
i
φ ′ =+ + + −
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This expression can be interpreted as the expected payout on firm l stock dis-
counted by the subjective stochastic discount factor. The latter is equal to 1/(1+i) 
times the investor’s marginal utility of wealth U′ . But, whereas standard asset pric-
ing theories concentrate on the market pricing of risk that follows from the properties 
of the stochastic discount factor, we will keep in mind that the right-hand side of (3) 
also depends on p
l, and look at (3) as an equation which determines this price im-
plicitly.
6  
Additionally, we are interested in the corner solution xl = 1 which obtains when 
the objective function (1) of the representative retail investor is increasing in xl on 
the whole interval (0,1). Equivalently, the left-hand side of (2) is everywhere positive 
in xl and the investor actually gets to pay for the whole available stock the price be-
low the expected discounted payout: 
                 () ( ) 0
1
()( 1 ) ()()
1
ll l l l
l pU y A i w z m p y A A d A
i
φ ′ <+ + + −
+ ∫                  (3C) 
Naturally, there may be a whole continuum of prices satisfying this inequality. 
This situation is indeed possible and gives rise to multiple equilibria – an additional 
source of potential volatility not just in asset prices, but also in interest rates, invest-
ment levels, and output. As was mentioned in the introduction, a switch from 
a unique equilibrium implied by the internal price solution (3) to equilibrium multi-
plicity corresponding to a continuum of corner price solutions (3C) is possible by 
a mere shift of sentiment (a formal definition and extended discussion of the latter 
can be found in section 3). 
2.2 Firms 
Firms have c.r.s. production functions with uncertain productivity and trans-
form physical capital k and human capital m into output. The internal funds of the firm 
are insufficient to cover production costs, so it seeks external financing in both equity 
and debt form. The firm is a price-taker in both those markets. Recall that equity is 
sold to a subset of retail investors (those who observe the human capital input into 
the same firm), whereas debt financing is reserved to banks. Incorporating the expe-
rience of costly state verification modeling (Townsend, 1979), we assume that even 
delegated loan managers of relationship banks are unable to observe the human capi-
tal input with enough precision to support a state-contingent (equity) contract. This 
allows us to exclude from consideration the case of banks holding equity. 
For the time being, unless this causes ambiguity, we will omit the industry 
index l when discussing a firm’s actions. 
Human capital input m must be paid for up-front in period 1. For simplicity, 
we assume that firms do not have initial cash holdings to do this. So a firm using m 
units of human capital has to borrow from banks at least the amount zm. More bor-
rowing may be needed to finance physical capital, for which the identity k = k0+p+b 
holds. Here, k0 is the initial non-traded “foundation” stock, i.e., the stock held by 
the company founders, p is the “market capitalization”, i.e., the value of shares sold 
6 Note that, being an equation which generalizes the conventional asset-pricing formulae, (3) introduces 
an equity market-based (co-)determination mechanism for physical capital. Such a mechanism is absent 
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in the equity market (recall that we have normalized the number of shares to unity), 
and, finally, b is the physical capital financed by a bank loan. 
In the second period, the firm produces Af(k,m) units of output. We assume that 
the whole stock of physical capital is then released as a part of firm earnings so that, 
in total, they are equal to Af(k,m) + k. (Since this is a two-period model, it makes lit-
tle sense to consider capital depreciation explicitly.) Recall that in period 2, the m-in-
put has already been paid for from bank credit.
7 So, the dividend to stockholders is 
equal to what remains of the output after the total debt, i.e., zm+b, is serviced. De-
fault occurs if output is not enough to repay the debt, in which case the bank seizes 
all earnings. Let the lending rate be r (taken by the firm as given, see more in the next 
subsection). Formally, shareholder dividends are 
                               { } ( ) max ( , ) (1 )( ),0 yA A fkm k r z m b =+ − + +  
If the firm does not default, this dividend can also be written as 
                                            Af(q+b,m)+q-(1+r)zm-rb                        (4) 
where q=k0+p is total equity capital (traded and non-traded).
8  
Each firm is run by a risk-neutral manager. For simplicity, we assume that he 
acts in the best interest of the shareholders (i.e., we abstract from agency effects in 
the  shareholder-firm manager relationship). That is, the  manager’s objective is to 
maximize the expected dividend. The important nuance is that the said expectations 
are formed on the basis of the manager’s superior knowledge of productivity.
9 Name-
ly, we assume that productivity is a product of two components: A = LS, of which S  
is the systemic uncertainty, perceived by everybody in this economy as a random 
variable with known distribution (for simplicity, let it be the same distribution for all 
firms). On the other hand, L is the firm-specific component, whose exact realization 
is known to the  manager (and also to the  relationship banker; see subsection 2.3 
below) but not to either the retail investor or the wholesale bank.
10  
Let us assume that there are exactly as many firms (industries) as there are pro-
ductivity types. Then, our use of the same letter to index the firm set L (lowercase l) 
7 In this way, we avoid the need to account for the consequences of possible firm default on payment to
m-suppliers. In principle, we could have defined a contract with m-suppliers receiving payment in period 2.
Then, under default, these claimholders would have been pooled with the lending bank for the purposes of 
debt resolution. However, this would have meant unnecessary technical complications without a contribu-
tion to the main task of the present analysis, which is to explore the real consequences of interactions between
firms and banks. In addition, the used cash-in-advance constraint for m-supply allows us to simultaneously 
equip the model with both a liquidity constraint on the borrower side and a source of leverage. The latter 
emerges because (section 2.1) the sum of zm across retail investors acts both as the cash deposited by them 
in banks (in excess of the initial wealth) and the lower bound of the credit volume granted by banks to 
firms. 
8 Note the difference between our q-variable and the net worth variable of Bernanke et al. (1999) and suc-
cessors: since the latter (financial-frictions) models do not have explicit equity markets, their net worth value
is monolithic, whereas ours is naturally split into foundation and traded stock. 
9 One can compare this feature with Bernanke et al. (1999) and successor models: these, too, contain both
aggregate and firm-specific uncertainty, but the role of the former is played down, at a fairly high cost for 
the interpretation of results. Indeed, when systemic uncertainty is present, Bernanke et al. (1999) do not
even have a proper debt contract in the model, and the state-contingent hybrid they have to use instead is 
quite difficult to rationalize. On the contrary, our model faces systemic uncertainty as a key fundamental 
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and firm-specific productivity value (uppercase L, and lowercase l for its log) should 
not cause confusion. 
The firm manager takes the offered lending rate r and the m-price z as given. 
It is natural to assume that the equity price p and the overall level of equity capital q 
are also exogenous to him. He decides on optimal levels of m and b knowing that in 
default, the dividend he strives to maximize is zero. The critical level of systemic 
production uncertainty above/below which the firms survives/defaults is
11  
                                               
(1 )
(, )
d rz m r b q
S




           (5) 
Therefore, his dividend expectation is calculated over realizations of S exceed-
ing  S
d. Let us denote the  cumulative distribution function of S by X and the  cor-
responding density by χ. The survival probability is then X
+(S
d) = 1-X(S
d), and we 
will also need the notation 






+ = ∫ , 
0
() SS S χ
+∞
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dd SS S Ψ Ψ
−+ =−  











+ =  
Note that  ( )
d S θ  is the  expected systemic productivity component condi-
tioned on survival. 
 
Lemma 1 Given the equity capital level q, human capital price z, and lending rate r, 
the optimal decisions of a firm of productivity type L on m and b are characterized by 
the first-order conditions 
                                           ( ) (, ) ( 1 )
d
m SL fq b m r z θ += +           ( 6 a )  
                                                 ( ) (, )
d
k SL f q b mr θ + =           ( 6 b )  
(In (6), subscripts denote partial derivatives.) The proof is straightforward 
given that, when calculating expected dividends, the firm manager integrates only 
over realizations of S that exceed S
d. As a consequence, the marginal products enter 
the first-order condition with the tail expectation multiplier ψ
+(S
d), whereas the re-
maining part of the partial derivative of the dividend expression (5) does so with 
the survival probability multiplier X
+(S
d). 
10 Exact L-knowledge by both the firm manager and the delegated loan manager (relationship banker) is 
a useful technical simplification which, on the other hand, is not central to the qualitative results. What is 
important is that the degree of knowledge on the firm and the relationship bank side, even if different, is 
higher than that of the retail investor and the wholesale bank. 
11 Although this cutoff value is formally analogous to similar parameters used by Bernanke et al. (1999),
Christiano et al. (2008), and related models (the usual notation there is ω ), one should keep in mind that our 
critical productivity value refers to systemic uncertainty realizations conditional on the given firm-specific 
uncertainty, whereas the named papers work with the firm-specific component. 102                                            Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 
Since we assume a fixed supply of m, (6a) will be interpreted as a market-clear-
ing condition for z, i.e., characterization of the human capital price that equalizes 
the fixed supply with the demand determined by the marginal product of m. The sec-
ond optimality condition, (6b), is an implicit characterization of the credit demand 
b = B(r) as a – decreasing – function of the lending rate charged. This is the firm 
manager’s reaction function in the game it plays with the bank (see section 2.3 and 
the subsequent section). Naturally, B also depends on q, z, and the parameters of 
the model, but we omit them for simplicity in the notation. 
 
Remark Since the production function is c.r.s., by combining (5), (6), and 
the Euler identity one arrives at the following condition for the survival threshold S
d: 












           (7) 
In (7),  ( ) ˆ d bS  is the optimal choice of b implied by (6). The above condition 
is an equation for S
d whose solution depends on z, r, and q as parameters. The prob-
lem is that for typical distributions, production functions, and a subset of otherwise 
realistic parameter values, this equation may have either two solutions or none at all. 
In the latter case, equilibrium equity+debt financing of such a firm cannot exist either, 
regardless of the presence of other firm types in the economy. In the former case, 
there emerges a possibility of two equilibria corresponding to high/low debt-financed 
levels of capital and high/low default probability in this firm type. Thus, our model is 
able to imitate real economic instability as a result of tiny financial shocks (see more 
in section 4). 
Now assume that the firm manager maximizes the unconditional expectation 
of after-interest earnings (i.e., including the expectation over those S-realizations that 
would make net earnings negative in the absence of limited liability). Such a man-
ager will borrow the following “unlimited liability” quantity of funds: 
                                                 (, ) ( 1 ) m SLf q b m r z += +                 (6aUL) 
                                                       (, ) k SLf q b m r + =                   (6bUL) 
(Recall that S  is the unconditional mean of systemic productivity compo-
nent S.) That is, although the default consequences for the lender are the same as in 
the limited liability case, i.e., the bank seizes the output, whose value is insufficient 
to repay the debt in full, the manager behaves “as if” he bore the full brunt of in-
solvency. To make managers behave like that, one would need, for example, a com-
pensation scheme that is a function of after-interest earnings, e.g. a fixed fee, plus 
a percentage of actual – positive or negative – earnings. Similar remuneration schemes 
of “proportional liability” form, also in a much more general setting than the present 
one, have been considered by, for instance, Hui (2003). 
In any event, firm choices based on (6UL) instead of (6) lead to the following 
analogue of (7): 
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Now, the default threshold is uniquely determined by the endogenous vari-
ables b, q, and r and the parameters of the model, i.e., the problem of equilibrium in-
determinacy disappears. Unfortunately, managerial compensation schemes able to 
induce the said “unlimited liability behavior” are mostly a hypothetical possibility 
which one rarely encounters in corporate remuneration practice. Therefore, counting 
on financial intermediation disruptions following from the limited liability case (6), 
(7) is an empirical necessity. 
2.3 Banks 
The lending bank interaction with the borrower takes the form of a leader- 
-follower game in which the bank is the leader and the firm is the follower. If a firm 
approaches a bank with a credit request, the latter makes an interest rate take-it-or- 
-leave-it offer and the former decides on the loan volume based on this offer. That is, 
the firm formulates an optimal reaction to every value of the proposed lending rate 
(reaction function) and the bank sets the lending rate based on the information it has 
about this reaction function.
12  
The action of a bank depends on whether it is the original wholesale bank 
which negotiates the loan or the negotiations are delegated to a relationship banker. 
In the first case, the bank has a belief distribution over the borrower’s productivity 
value A as a whole (convolution of beliefs about S and L). In the second case, we as-
sume that the delegated loan manager knows type L exactly (just like the firm man-
ager) and only faces systemic uncertainty regarding S. As a  result, the  wholesale 
banker sets a common interest rate for all borrowers, whereas relationship bankers 
with delegation set separate rates for individual types. 
Banks are assumed risk-neutral. The bank faces a cost of funds which, for 
simplicity, we denote by i (the same as the deposit rate for retail investors) and as-
sume a linear funding price regardless of volume. In section 4, we will look at the con-
sequences of relaxing the last of these three assumptions. Deviations from either of 
the first two assumptions can be easily accommodated in the model as well, but are 
of subordinate importance for the subject of the paper. 
We formulate the rate-setting problem of the delegated loan manager first. In 
the notation of the previous subsection, a firm of type L borrows B = zm+b, where 
the optimal quantities of both components are determined by the optimality condi-
tions (6). Thus, from (6a), with  ˆ m and  ˆˆ kq b = +  being the optimal levels of, respec-
tively, human and physical capital, 










           (8) 
Since we have agreed that m is in fixed supply for each firm (price z equalizes 
this supply with optimal demand), one can drop the  hat in the  notation:  ˆ mm = . 
12 Since we make no further restrictions on the bank profit (e.g. no zero-profit assumption meant to imitate 
perfect competition), this set-up endows the bank with market power. The fact that, generically, a bank-
-client relationship is not fully competitive on either part was recognized by the literature a long time ago. 
Santomero (1984) is an example of this early consensus. A more specific (and recent) example of imper-
fect competition modeling has to do with the concept of client “catch-up” in a specific bank – see e.g. 
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Further,  ˆ b  can be expressed through L, m, q, r, and θ = θ(S
d) by using (6b). Often, 
the expression can be made explicit. For instance, for the Cobb-Douglas production 
function  f(k,m) = k
αm
1-α the  named first-order conditions imply that for optimally 
chosen physical and human capital,  ˆ k  and  ˆ m ,  () ()
1 1 ˆ ˆˆ , f km L r m
α
α αθ
− − = . Then, the pre-
ferred loan volume under lending rate r is equal to 




11 1 ˆ ,,,, ,
(1 ) (1 )
rr











In all cases, we will write B = B(r) for the firm’s choice of loan volume, by 
omitting the remaining arguments whenever it does not cause confusion. 
 
Remark One can imagine situations in which the optimal level of physical 
capital is below the already available equity capital q, i.e., the firm does not need to 
finance physical capital by debt. It only has to borrow zm to finance “current first 
period expenditures”, i.e., to pay for the human capital input. However, one can show 
that limiting lending to zm is infeasible as an equilibrium outcome for many im-
portant special cases. For instance, under the Cobb-Douglas production, banks would 
be unwilling to lend at a finite rate to such firms. Therefore, we will not consider such 
cases in this paper. In the numeric examples to be discussed later, the equilibrium 
debt levels turn out to far exceed the current expenditure needs anyway. 
The revenue from the  loan is (1+r)B(r) if the  realization of S is above S
d 
(the firm survives) and  ( ) ˆˆ , SLf k m k +  if S<S
d. The cost is (1+i)B(r) in both cases. 
The expected profit is taken over realizations of S (L is known) and can be written as 
             ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ (,) ( 1 )() ( 1 )()
RB d d d J Lr S L f X S k X S rBr iBr Ψ
−+ =+ + + − +          (9) 
In (9), superscript RB refers to relationship banker and  ˆ f  is shorthand for 
the production function value under the optimal choice of the firm. The loan manager 
chooses r to maximize the right-hand side of (9) with knowledge of the loan demand 
function given by (8). When this maximization problem has a  (finite) solution,   
and, under this solution, the firm equity is priced according to (3) or (3C), we obtain 
an  equilibrium lending rate for the  delegated loan management case for the  firms 
belonging to type (industry) L. This rate is type-dependent. 
When the wholesale bank sets the rate for all firms itself without delegation, it 
has the objective function obtained by taking the expectation over L of the right-hand 
side of (9). That is (superscript AL refers to the arm’s length handling of credit pro-
vision), 
                                           () (,) ()
AL RB J r J Lr Ld L ψ =∫                      (10) 
where  ψ is the  probability density function of the  public’s (hence also wholesale 
banks’) beliefs about L. In both the retail and the wholesale bank cases, the stock 
price p (equivalently, the amount of physical capital financed by equity q) of the loan 
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Functions J
RB and J
AL both have at most one internal maximum r
*(q) in r for 
every value of q. It is given by the obvious first-order condition 
                                           (* ) (* ) (* ) 0 rr r Jr Nr Bri = −=                      (11) 
In (11), the superscript is dropped for notational economy and N denotes 
the sum of the four first terms on the right-hand side of (9) in the relationship bank-
ing case and their L-expectation as given by the right-hand side of (10) in the whole-
sale banking case. Subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
For the equilibrium to exist, the curves r
*(q) and q
* = q0+p
*(r) must intersect 
in the (q,r)-plane. (Here, p
* is the stock price of the borrower, determined in sub-
section 2.2 as a function of lending rate r; this is a function if the price satisfies (3) 
and a correspondence if it satisfies (3C)). If the curves do not intersect, the equi-
librium does not exist. If they intersect at more than one point, there are multiple 
equilibria. 
3 Bubbly and Bubble-Free Equilibria 
We go over to discussing quantitative properties of the model equilibria, which 
we have obtained by numerically solving the equation system (3), (11) with respect 
to variables q (equity capital) and r (the lending rate). The equilibria are naturally 
split into two categories. The first is arm’s length (henceforth denoted AL) loan man-
agement, where there is one lending rate for all borrowers. The second is relationship 
banking (RB), where there is one lending rate for each borrower type L. Recall that 
the stock price, equal to share capital less the foundation stake (p = q-q0), is in both 
cases common to all firm types, since retail investors in every stock have the same 
imperfect information about type as wholesale banks. In the following, we show 
the results for the simplified situation of just two productivity types, deviating down-
wards or upwards from the average (so that L∈{Ld,Lu}, Ld<Lu), in which loan man-
agement is either AL or RB for all firms at once. If there were more than two 
elements in set L, one could also consider different wholesale banks choosing dif-
ferent subsets of L in which to try out delegation, but this ramification is left outside 
the present analysis. 
Information held by retail investors and wholesale banks alike is parameter-
ized by the  value λ giving the  perceived proportion of high-productivity firms in 
the economy. We think of this information as being a result of a Bayesian update of 
some prior belief distribution common to all agents.
13 Every firm, although unable to 
communicate its productivity type credibly to anyone but its relationship banker, 
is nonetheless able to send an unbiased, even if noisy, public signal about its type. 
Then, the  Bayesian belief update procedure results in a  reduction (depending on 
the relative variances of the signal noise and the prior belief distributions), albeit 
never complete elimination, of the prior error in the public perception. 
Note that when the solution of the equation system (3), (11) is being sought, 
the relevant value of λ is the one characterizing the beliefs and not the actual propor-
tion of high-productivity firms (by the law of large numbers, it should be the same 
 
13 The assumption of common prior beliefs was made to simplify the analysis of public sentiment implica-
tions. It can be easily relaxed if there are reasons to consider belief differentials across important sub-
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Table 1  Economic Fundamentals in Equilibrium with Unbiased Sentiment 
Proportion of high- 
-productivity 
borrowers → 
λ = 0.4  λ = 0.5  λ = 0.6 
Indicator ↓    Aggregate    Aggregate  Aggregate 
q  3.244 3.328 3.398 
r  0.074 0.075 0.076 
Bd  16.391 16.055 15.649 






kd 17.256  17.017  16.698 






yd  21.088 20.832 20.489 
AL 






qd  3.009 3.138 3.267 
qu  3.389 3.413 3.440 
rd  0.081 0.080 0.079 
ru  0.070 0.072 0.075 
Bd  14.304 14.433 14.575 






kd  15.055 15.299 15.555 






yd  18.718 18.981 19.257 
RB 






Notes: The foundation stake q0 in firm equity is at level 0.2. The cost of lendable funds (deposit rate) is 0.03. 
For firms of type #, q# is total equity capital, r# is the borrowing rate, B# is the volume of credit taken, 
k# is the total investment in physical capital, y# is expected gross output (when the systemic productiv-
ity factor takes its expected value of 1), AL is arm’s length loan management, and RB is relationship 
banking (delegated loan management) 
 
thing when the bias is zero). This is because the perceived λ enters both the retail 
investor and the wholesale banker decision problem (delegated loan managers al-
ready know the exact borrower type, so that for them the value of λ is irrelevant). 
The true λ is important for determining economy-wide aggregates (e.g. investment, 
bank credit, and average output) after individual decision problems have been solved 
and equilibrium established. 
We begin by showing the results of the equilibrium calculation in the unbias-
ed sentiment case and then discuss the changes caused by either optimistic or pessi-
mistic prejudice.
14  
The results for the  unbiased sentiment case are shown in Table 1. As one 
might expect, more high-productivity firms (i.e., higher value λ, both perceived and 
actual as long as there is no prior bias) in the economy means more equity invest-
ment, but also higher lending rates (for everyone in the AL case and on average for 
the RB case). A less obvious outcome is a fall in bank credit, investment, and output 
for each individual type at the same time as the aggregate values of these fundamen-
tals grow with λ. This is a sort of “income effect”: when high-productivity firms are 
more numerous, less effort is needed to attain a given level of expected output. 
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Further, looking specifically at the equilibria in the relationship banking envi-
ronment, one sees that lending rates for low-productivity firms fall (moderately) with 
growing λ, whereas they grow with λ for high-productivity firms. At the same time, 
higher λ corresponds to higher levels of bank credit, investment, and output in the low- 
-productivity segment, but lower levels of the same fundamentals in the high-pro-
ductivity segment. 
Finally, for each fixed λ, aggregate investment, bank credit, and output (we 
will refer to them collectively as “economic activity”) are lower in RB economies 
than in AL ones. This is true when public sentiment is unbiased but can be violated 
under some realizations of prior prejudice. That is, it turns out that in the world we 
have created it is often welfare improving to know less, i.e., not to delegate lending 
to loan managers who know the borrower type, rather than more (the effect is due to 
the cheaper credit that, on average, the imperfectly informed wholesale banks charge 
everybody; relationship banks, by contrast, charge low-productivity borrowers a dis-
proportionately high risk premium). So, in our model, not unlike the developed econ-
omies shortly before the outbreak of the latest crisis, banks are tempted to refrain 
from the  costly use of intermediary agents with superior information and instead 
grant loans based on general formal rules (this is the essence of the AL-approach). 
Potentially, AL could also mean transferring loans to third parties whose ability to 
gain “soft” information on borrowers is minimal. 
Note that all the discussed effects result from a complex interplay between 
equity and debt markets, i.e., they cannot be obtained by simply combining the two 
partial-equilibrium models of each market separately. In the latter, investment and 
output would always fall with rising lending rate (like in the IS-equation of the old 
Keynesian models), and the same is true for the equity price. Looking at Table 1, one 
immediately sees that our approach renders substantially different reduced-form be-
havior patterns of the basic fundamentals. 
Next, let us turn to the role of bias in public perception, and the resulting 
equity bubbles. The results are collected in Table 2. Within each borrower type, 
the  determination of the  equilibrium equity price and lending rate depends on 
the  perception (not the  actual λ), i.e., it does not depend on prior bias as such. 
The difference between subjective beliefs and reality matters for the observed eco-
nomic aggregates. As expected, aggregate bank credit, as well as investment and out-
put, grow along with the actual proportion of high-productivity firms. On the other 
hand, for every fixed value of actual λ, economic activity falls with growing perceiv-
ed λ. In other words, there exists an aggregate cost of incorrect economic sentiment. 
In this respect, RB economies are slightly less sensitive to prior bias than AL econ-
omies, and it may also occasionally happen that the RB output under a particular 
sentiment value exceeds the AL output (as when perceived λ is 0.4 and the actual one 
is 0.6 in our example). In all cases, inspection of Table 2 suggests that, for a fixed 
absolute size of sentiment error, it is socially preferable when people are pessimistic. 
This follows from comparing economic activity for, say, the combination actual 
λ=0.4, perceived λ=0.5 with the combination actual λ=0.5, perceived λ=0.4, etc. It 
remains to be seen to what extent this particular result is influenced by the orthodox 
efficient market paradigm of equity pricing used. The use of the latter paradigm may 
also be responsible for the relatively high sensitivity of economic activity values to 
 108                                            Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 




λ=0.4  λ=0.5  λ=0.6 
True value of λ→  0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 
  Indicator ↓   
q  3.244 3.244 3.244 3.328 3.328 3.328 3.398 3.398 3.398 
r  0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.076 
B  19.595 20.396 21.197 19.069 19.823 20.576 18.516 19.232 19.949 
k  20.072 20.776 21.480 19.663 20.324 20.986 19.211 19.839 20.467 
AL 
y  24.443 25.282 26.120 24.014 24.809 25.605 23.534 24.296 25.057 
qd  3.009 3.009 3.009 3.138 3.138 3.138 3.267 3.267 3.267 
qu  3.389 3.389 3.389 3.413 3.413 3.413 3.440 3.440 3.440 
rd  0.081 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.079 
ru  0.070 0.070 0.070 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.075 0.075 0.075 
B  19.061 20.396 21.197 18.499 19.516 20.533 18.062 18.933 19.805 
k  19.495 20.605 21.715 19.050 19.988 20.926 18.723 19.515 20.307 
RB 
y  23.820 25.096 26.372 23.353 24.446 25.539 23.009 23.946 24.884 
Notes: The foundation stake q0 in firm equity is at level 0.2. The cost of lendable funds (deposit rate) is 0.03. 
For firms of type #, q# is total equity capital and r# is the borrowing rate; variables without subscripts 
denote economy-wide aggregates; B is the volume of credit taken, k is the total investment in physical 
capital, y is expected gross output (when the systemic productivity factor takes its expected value of 1), 
AL is arm’s length loan management, and RB is relationship banking (delegated loan management). 
 
sentiment changes: whereas the  interest rate changes by 0.1 percent, the  output 
values shift by 3 percent or more under a 0.1-size change of sentiment (i.e., the per-
ceived λ-value). 
4. Macro-Prudential Capital Charges and Bubble Containment 
In this section, we will test the ability of the constructed model to address the real 
effects of macroprudential regulation of financial intermediaries. The prime objective 
of such regulation is to contain the size of asset price bubbles before they burst (see, 
for example, Posen, 2009, for a review). We first calculate the equilibria with macro-
prudential bank capital surcharges in a bubble-free economy in subsection 4.1, and 
then analyze the ability of the same instrument to reduce the real effects of a bubble 
caused by biased sentiment. 
There is enough reliable evidence that the debt volume grows and its quality 
deteriorates much faster in the run-up to a financial crisis than in normal times. There-
fore, policymakers have for some time been looking for an adequate means to damp-
en unusual debt expansions and prevent credit bubbles without tethering “genuine” 
growth. One of the instances of this search is the discussion of an “anti-cyclical” re-
form of the Basel II capital requirements on banks. At the moment, reliable recipes 
for separating bubbles from sustainable growth are unavailable. So, most probably, in 
the pursuit of their financial stability goals, most regulators would resort to simple 
penalties for suspicious credit expansions by mandating the attribution of increased 
risk weights to all lending that visibly exceeds the accepted target. That is, the macro-
prudential policy instruments one is most likely to see are capital requirements for – 
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ments that would grow convexly with loan volume. In the present model, we can ac-
commodate such an instrument by replacing the linear cost-of-funds term in the bank 
objective function by a linear-quadratic term that contains a surcharge on the loan 
volume in proportion to growing borrower leverage. That is, we model an instrument 
formally resembling the much-discussed Financial Stability Levy (FSL) on liabilities 
of banks, which would force the latter to apply a similar metric to their asset side as 
well. 
Formally, we introduce the  following macro-prudential control mechanism 
into the model. If the target level of physical capital of the borrower is k and the loan 
size is B, the bank is subject to an additional charge (in the form of regulatory capi-






, where a is a positive constant. 







This means that 
(a)  funding costs are growing as a  convex function of the loan volume and not 
linearly as the original equation (9) stated; 
(b)  the surcharge is proportional to the product of the loan volume and the borrower’s 
debt-to-physical capital ratio; every additional unit of credit is penalized unless 
offset by physical capital collateral financed with equity; 
(c)  the unit of penalty for uncollateralized credit is a, usually a small number in 
the order of single-digit percentage points.
15  
4.1 No-Bubble Equilibria 
The calculation of equilibrium under prudential capital surcharges can proceed 
in the same way as before, with only term N in equation (11) to be modified in ac-
cordance with the new definition of funding costs. We show the results for the base 
case of equal borrower type weights and no prior bias in Table 3. For the sake of ac-
curate comparison with the original model without prudential policy instruments,  
we assume that the extra funding costs carried by the banks are turned back over to 
the private sector in the form of transfers (e.g. tax relief) and, therefore, are included 
in the aggregate output measures. 
What we see upon inspecting Table 3 is that macroprudential policies in the de-
fined form increase the price of credit and generate a tangible burden on economic 
activity. The bulk of this burden is carried by high-productivity borrowers, so that 
their distance from low-productivity ones in terms of investment and output is now 
smaller. In the present model, high-productivity firms take on more risks and default 
more frequently than those in the low-productivity segment. So, if the objective of 
macroprudential policies is to put a check on the expansion of the riskiest segments 
of the bank loan market, it is being achieved through dampening economic activity in 
the high-productivity  segment. On the  other hand, if the  stabilization objective of 
the macroprudential instrument involves the number of defaults (this can be the case 
if defaults carry a negative externality that enters the social planner’s objective func-
tion), then its introduction in our environment is clearly counter-productive: the num- 
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Table 3  Economic Fundamentalsin Equilibrium withand without Prudential Capital 
Surcharges 
Prudential capital surcharge 
→ 
No Yes 
Indicator ↓    Aggregate  Aggregate 
q  3.328 2.999 
r  0.075 0.085 
Ld  +0 +0  Default 
probability  Lu  0.025 0.039 
Bd  16.055 13.304 




kd 17.017  14.101 




yd  20.832 17.684 
AL 




qd  3.138 2.756 
qu  3.413 3.099 
rd  0.080 0.094 
ru  0.072 0.081 
Ld  +0 +0  Default 
probability  Lu  0.022 0.034 
Bd  14.433 11.437 




kd  15.299 12.116 




yd  18.981 15.528 
RB 




Notes: Results are shown for the perceived share λ = 0.5 of high-productivity borrowers and no prior bias. 
The base capital surcharge a is 1 percent per 1
st unit of credit uncollateralized by physical capital. 
The foundation stake q0 in firm equity is at level 0.2. The cost of lendable funds (deposit rate) is 0.03. 
For firms of type #, q# is total equity capital, r# is the borrowing rate, B# is the volume of credit taken, 
k# is the total investment in physical capital, y# is expected gross output (when the systemic productivity 
factor takes its expected value of 1), AL is arm’s length loan management, and RB is relationship 
banking (delegated loan management) 
 
ber of defaults is now higher. And since the relationship banking regime in general  
is more favorable to high-productivity firms, the costs of new policies are higher in  
RB-economies as well. 
Naturally, the actual raison d’être for a macroprudential tool of the above type 
is its ability to stabilize inflation and output in the medium run, i.e., it can only fully 
transpire in a dynamic environment. Nevertheless, the consequences of its application  
in terms of expensive credit and low investment are likely to carry over from the pres-
ent two-period to a multi-period model. Therefore, it would be always welfare-im-
proving if one had a capital charge mechanism that could minimize the side effects 
for quality borrowers. To cover this ground, we considered a variant of the present 
model with proportional liability rules for firm management remuneration, which 
effectively induces unlimited-liability decisions on capital structure and input pur-
chases. This is how we explore the conjecture that a welfare-improving capital re- 
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Table 4  Economic Fundamentals in Equilibrium when Borrower Incentives Replicate 
Either Limited or Unlimited Liability Conditions 
Borrower incentives →  LL-consistent UL-consistent 
Indicator ↓    Aggregate  Aggregate 
q  3.328 3.916 
r  0.075 0.075 
Ld  +0 +0  Default 
probability  Lu  0.025      0.00086 
Bd  16.055 15.505 




kd 17.017  17.053 




yd  20.832 20.870 
AL 




qd  3.138 3.072 
qu  3.413 3.881 
rd  0.080 0.076 
ru  0.072 0.077 
Ld  +0        0.000051  Default 
probability  Lu  0.022      0.00062 
Bd  14.433 15.879 




kd  15.299 16.606 




yd  18.981 20.390 
RB 




Notes: Results are shown for the perceived share λ = 0.5 of high-productivity borrowers and no prior bias. 
The foundation stake q0 in firm equity is at level 0.2. The cost of lendable funds (deposit rate) is 0.03. 
For firms of type #, q# is total equity capital, r# is the borrowing rate, B# is the volume of credit taken, 
k# is the total investment in physical capital, y# is expected gross output (when the systemic productiv-
ity factor takes its expected value of 1), AL is arm’s length loan management, and RB is relationship 
banking (delegated loan management). Borrower management incentives are either consistent with 
limited liability (LL) or imitate unlimited liability (UL). 
 
quirement policy may aim at encouraging lending to personally liable borrowers and 
penalizing excessive exposure to borrowers with conventional limited liability. Sup-
porting evidence in the present setting is provided by a comparison of the outcomes 
of the benchmark model (limited-liability borrowers) with those of the model under 
the said imitation of unlimited liability behavior (cf. the remark at the end of sub-
section 2.2).
16 The comparison (under equal productivity type weights and unbiased 
public sentiment) is summarized in Table 4. We see that the induced mimicry of un-
limited liability behavior has four major consequences compared to the benchmark: 
16 Recall that the considered behavior of the borrower firm does not mean that the lender gets full repay-
ment in all states of nature, of which in adverse states of nature (output less than debt service, i.e., default)
a part of the compensation comes from the borrower’s private wealth. As before, in default the jointly
available assets of the firm and its management are insufficient to service the debt. All that is assumed 
here is that the firm manager compensation is an affine function of firm earnings less debt service. In that
case, the manager would select production inputs as if the firm operated under unlimited liability. 112                                            Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 
(a) the lending rates of both productivity types get quite close in the RB case and 
approach the common lending rate of the LA case; 
(b) there is a sharp increase in the equity value of the high-productivity type, and 
a minor decrease in the equity value of the low-productivity type; 
(c) the default probability of the high-productivity type falls substantially, whereas 
for the low-productivity type, although formally increasing, this probability re-
mains negligible; 
(d) economic activity experiences a minor reduction compared to the limited liability 
borrower behavior. 
If the prime concern of the policymaker is to find a macroprudential policy 
without a major negative impact on economic activity, unlimited liability mimicry by 
borrowers, if one could get near it, would have an advantage over the previously con-
sidered convex capital surcharge instrument, provided one were at the same time able 
to encourage delegated loan management in banks. Indeed, suppose that unlimited 
liability mimicry is impossible to implement in the AL regime, but possible in the RB 
regime (that is, the relationship banker is able to influence the manager incentive 
structure in the borrowing firm). In that case, the trade-off for the macroprudential 
policy is between a convex capital surcharge in wholesale banks against unlimited 
borrower liability mimicry in the RB regime without capital surcharges. Comparing 
the upper right panel of Table 3 with the lower right panel of Table 4, one sees that 
the losses in economic activity caused by abandonment of limited liability are more 
than compensated by the possibility to give up additional capital requirements. A re-
duction in default rates comes as a bonus on top of that. 
4.2 Economic Activity under a Bubble, and Containment Alternatives 
Now we go over to the description of the same outcomes as in the previous 
subsection, but in the presence of a bubble. The experiment we conduct uses a posi-
tive bubble generated by a prior belief of 40% low-productivity producers, whereas 
their true proportion is 60%. The results are collected in Table 5. 
In all three lending regimes considered (baseline with limited borrower liabili-
ty and without macroprudential capital charges, under macroprudential capital charges, 
and under proportional downside risk of the borrower management), the bubble means 
higher equity prices compared to the  no-bubble benchmark. The  extent of equity 
overvaluation is somewhat higher under delegated loan management. Average out-
put, on the other hand, is lower under the bubble. A little surprisingly, default proba-
bilities are lower compared to the  benchmark. Apparently, the  mechanism of this 
reduction has to do with lower interest rates charged to high-productivity firms under 
optimistic sentiment. 
Under the arms’ length bank business model, the most important finding in 
the context of our objective is that in the presence of the macroprudential instrument, 
bubble removal (restoration of unbiased sentiment) has a marginally stronger impact 
on both the equity price and output than in the baseline. In the considered case of 
a positive bubble, the equity price falls and output rises when the bubble disappears, 
the same as in the baseline. The difference between bubbly and no-bubble interest 
rates is also mildly stronger. Unfortunately, this effect is achieved at the cost of a re-
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Under loan management delegation (relationship banking), the  quantitative 
effects of the macroprudential capital charges are even less convincing, since, com-
pared to the baseline, both the output gain and the bubbly price correction are 
smaller. The adverse absolute impact on output is even more severe than in the AL 
business model. Altogether, macroprudential policies in a relationship banking en-
vironment can, according to the present analysis, be very disappointing due to their 
inability to exploit the informational advantages of delegated loan managers. 
On the other hand, enforcing firm manager downside risk, if feasible, could 
both reduce the sensitivity of the real economy to the asset price bubble and (the same  
as in the no-bubble benchmark) improve the absolute output levels. 
The conducted exercise suggests that the convex macro-prudential capital 
charge on bank loans has two main advantages. First, it helps investors coordinate on 
an equilibrium mix of equity and debt financing in situations in which equilibria  
do not exist in the absence of this instrument. In our model this happens particularly 
when firm productivity types are distributed very unevenly or when public economic 
sentiment is highly biased. Second, it reduces imprudent leverage of highly produc-
tive borrowers. 
On the contrary, the main problems associated with the use of this instrument 
can be seen in 
–  a uniform and significant increase in lending rates for all borrowers; 
–  an increase in default rates (which may be a problem if they are associated with 
welfare externalities not considered in the model); 
–  excessive sensitivity of investment and output to small changes of the  capital 
charge rate (this has to do with the additional transmission channel through equity 
markets). 
Above all, the discussed macroprudential instrument contributes very slightly 
to suppressing the most immediate consequence of biased sentiment, i.e., equity price 
bubbles. Its performance on the real economy side of bubble containment is marred 
by the overall dampening impact on investment and output. 
More generally, there seem to be limits, in terms of economic activity and ex 
ante welfare costs, to promoting financial stability through policies directed at credit 
providers. At the same time, policies with the unchanged ultimate objective of credit 
bubble prevention, but directed at credit consumers, have largely remained unex-
plored (let alone exploited). Our results indicate that the potential gain from such re- 
-orientation from regulating credit supply to educating credit demand may be worth-
while, notwithstanding numerous implementation difficulties. 
5. Conclusion 
We have constructed a model of a financial sector in a production economy 
subject to equity price bubbles. Our model accommodates endogenously mixed 
equity-debt financing of production. Further, it contains a flexible agency-based ra-
tionale for the role of banks and a workable quantification of the notion of economic 
sentiment (often considered a “soft”,  non-quantifiable  concept) within integrated 
macro-financial modeling setups. Additionally, we are able to investigate the real 
economic implications of macroprudential policies motivated by financial stability 
considerations. The main building blocks of this model are Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1                                     115 
–  constrained diversification of stock holdings by retail investors, 
–  exclusive access to financial intermediation technology by wholesale banks, 
–  choice between delegated and arm’s length loan management by wholesale banks, 
–  prior beliefs (public sentiment) about the productivity risks of firms, generating 
equity price bubbles that feed into investment, interest rates, and output. 
We formulate an  equation system characterizing equilibrium for the  cases 
with and without delegation of lending by wholesale banks. We also introduce a macro-
prudential regulatory policy resulting in a convex dependence of bank funding costs 
on the quantity of uncollateralized credit. Then we conduct comparative statics ex-
ercises with the help of numeric solutions to this system for a number of important 
cases. Those include: shifts in the prior economic sentiment of the public which lead 
to equity price bubbles; variations in the size of non-linear regulatory capital charges 
linked to unsecured loans; and relaxation of the conventional limited liability con-
straint on borrower behavior. 
Limited liability proves to be one of the main sources of equilibrium fragility: 
under many combinations of parameter values, equilibrium does not exist for pure lim-
ited liability borrowers but exists when borrowers mimic unlimited liability in their 
decisions under the pressure of specially designed incentives. 
The outcome of our experiments has shown that the sensitivity of the econo-
my to biased investor sentiment is not visibly reduced by macroprudential policies of 
the considered type. On the other hand, the dampening effect on absolute economic 
activity is considerable. This contrasts with the effect of introducing downside risk 
for borrower management. Such a policy, if one could implement it by an appropriate 
regulatory design on the lender side, is able to remove a large portion of the real 
economic sensitivity to equity price bubbles. 
The quantitative characteristics of equilibrium in our model are quite sensitive 
to the initial level of own capital of the borrower. Varying the levels of this “founda-
tion stake” can produce an equilibrium breakdown in the arm’s length lending case, 
generate multiple equilibria in both the arm’s length lending and the delegated loan 
management cases, and, in a synergetic effect with equity bubbles, cause large swings  
of interest rates and output. The effect is particularly strong in the textbook Cobb- 
-Douglas production environment, but might be somewhat mitigated in the presence 
of convex capital installation costs. 
We note that in all cases in which equilibrium either becomes indeterminate 
or falls apart, this happens in an environment governed by the standard (“Walrasian”) 
asset pricing paradigm. The latter is used to price company equity and hence also 
determine – in a one-to-one relation – the level of equity-financed physical capital. It 
is possible that an adjustment of the model that relaxes this unrealistic frictionless 
link between the stock price and investment will also be instrumental in restoring 
a well-defined unique equilibrium. This question is left to future research. 116                                             Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 
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